Introduction
In a globalized world, countries strategically invest in technology to maintain competitiveness, increase eciency, and stimulate growth. In particular investments in education, infrastructure and research and development (R&D) are supposed to improve a country's technology level. However, public expenditures related to technology improvements differ vastly across countries. Consider, for example, the teacher-per-pupils ratio as a basic proxy for educational quality.
1 Using World Bank data for the year 2006, Norway has a teacher-per-pupils ratio of one teacher to ten pupils, while Congo has a ratio of 1:83. The political debate highlights the importance of strategic technology investments in the light of falling trade barriers. The common theme is that highly integrated economies actually need better technology levels to allow their rms to keep up with foreign competition. 2
What is not well understood in the literature, is how international trade aects the government's incentive to strategically invest in technology. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature which discusses the impact of trade liberalization on a country's incentive to endogenously invest in technology. We analyze this issue in a general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous rms.
A framework with heterogeneous rms is a suitable basis for our analysis. This is for two reasons. First, it is a salient empirical feature that rms are heterogeneous in such dimensions as productivity, size, or export activity. 3 Second, and more importantly, it is the more realistic framework for our purposes. Technology investments raise the technological standard in a country as a whole. However, they do not necessarily improve the productivity in every single rm in this country in the same way and magnitude. 4 In our model we capture this idea by assuming a stochastic process, where rms randomly draw their productivity level from a common and known distribution. The government's technology investment is then modeled as an improvement of the support of this distribution and 1 To substantiate the teacher-per-pupils ratio as a measure for educational quality, see the UNESCO (2006) report on Teachers and Educational Quality, p. 26: The number and distribution of teachers are important policy parameters helping to determine the quality of education. The pupil-teacher ratio is a commonly-used indicator, reecting the human resource capacity of education systems.
2 See e.g. the Presidency Conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2008), p. 9: Providing high-quality education and investing more and more eciently in human capital and creativity throughout people's lives are crucial conditions for Europe's success in a globalized world.
3 Empirical literature that identies the existence of productivity heterogeneity on the rm level is e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Aw et al. (2000) , Clerides et al. (1998) or Bernard et al. (2003) . 4 For instance, recall a model with homogeneous rms like in Krugman (1980) . The only way to model technology improvements would be investments that decrease marginal costs of all rms. This would imply that every rm benets exactly in the same way and magnitude.
hence the investment leads to an increase of the average productivity across rms, but not necessarily to a productivity gain for each single producer.
The seminal model of an open economy with heterogeneous rms is Melitz (2003) . Demidova (2008) and Falvey et al. (2005) use that framework and allow for country-specic dierences in technology. They show that countries with a superior technology are also characterized by a higher average productivity, and exhibit welfare gains due to a lower price index. In these papers, technology dierences across countries are exogenous, however, while we consider endogenous technology dierences, which arise because of government investments.
Our model is based on an extension of the Melitz (2003) model provided by Pueger and Suedekum (2009) . Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost before they learn about their productivity level, which is randomly drawn from a common and known distribution. Firms with a suciently high productivity draw stay in the industry and start producing, and rms with a productivity below an endogenously determined cuto level exit immediately. Trade liberalization leads to a selection eect such that only the most productive rms start exporting, rms with intermediate productivity serve the domestic market only, and the least productive rms exit.
We introduce a government that invests in technology and these investments have to be renanced through a lump-sum tax. What is the incentive for this policy? In the closed economy, investments in technology tighten rm selection and lead to more productive rms, which sell larger quantity and charge lower prices. Thus, the increased toughness of competition has a positive welfare eect for consumers. In the open economy two aspects give countries a strategic incentive to invest in technology. Firstly, if one country invests more in technology than the other, this yields tougher competition in the leading country and softer competition in the laggard country. Secondly, exporting becomes easier for rms from the leading country, while exporters from the laggard country now face tougher competitors. Hence, technology investments in one country lead to a negative cross-country externality as they give domestic rms a competitive advantage on both markets.
In this paper, we study a setting with two countries, which strategically interact in technology investments to give their domestic rms a competitive advantage over foreign rms. Our results can be summarized as follows. In the closed economy countries have an incentive to invest if consumers have a suciently high preference for varieties. In the open economy we analyze the Nash-equilibrium policy and the cooperative policy that maximizes joint welfare. If there are no cross-country investment spillovers, the cooperative solution is equivalent to the autarky solution. In the Nash-equilibrium, countries strategically compete in their investment levels and increase their investments with higher trade openness in order to take advantage of the negative cross-country externality to foreign rms. From a social perspective we have an over-investment problem. If there are crosscountry investment spillovers, we dierentiate between weak and strong spillovers. In both cases, the cooperative solution predicts a positive relationship between investments and trade openness. If there are weak (strong) spillovers, we nd a positive (hump-shaped) relationship between investments and trade openness in the Nash-equilibrium. From a social perspective we obtain an over (under)-investment problem in the Nash-equilibrium policy if spillovers are weak (strong).
Related Literature
As mentioned above, our model is based on the seminal paper on heterogeneous rms by Melitz (2003) . His work incorporates heterogeneous rms into the monopolistically competitive framework by Krugman (1980) . Entry and exit of rms is modeled similarly as in Hopenhayn (1992) . Besides the broad literature on heterogeneous rms, there are several strands of literature which are related to our model. Firstly, this paper is related to the literature on technology gaps across countries, i.e., countries with dierent technologies. Demidova (2008) and Falvey et al. (2005) analyze technology dierences in a heterogeneous rms framework, where rms draw their productivity from dierent exogenously given distributions. These productivity distributions are such that one country has access to a superior distribution than the other, i.e., distributions can be ranked. Thereby Demidova (2008) assumes a general functional form and Falvey et al. (2005) consider the productivity distribution to be Pareto, with dierences in the support. However, no endogenous dierences due to technology investments are analyzed in these papers.
Secondly, there is more recent literature on policy issues in frameworks with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous rms (see e.g. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), Chor (2009)) . From that literature, Pueger and Suedekum (2009) is particular closely related as they consider strategic government interactions in entry subsidies. However, to our knowledge, none of these papers consider strategic technology investments. Finally, our model is related to the large industrial organization literature on R&D spillovers.
In this literature a rm's productivity is related to the own R&D spending, but it also pos-6 itively depends on the R&D spending of other rms in the industry and public spending in technology. This externality to other rms is commonly called a spillover. For instance, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) dene knowledge spillovers to include any original, valuable knowledge generated in the research process which becomes publicly accessible. Studies by Adams (1990) , Jae (1989) and Jae et al. (1998) examine knowledge spillovers from academic research to rms' R&D investments. These studies suggest that geographical proximity matters and that spillovers exhibit a rapid spatial decay. In our model we dierentiate between spillovers within a country and spillovers across countries, which depend on the degree of trade freeness. We add to this literature by studying the impact of trade liberalization in a general equilibrium framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the closed economy is presented. Section 
Closed Economy
Consider a single country under autarky. The economy is populated by L workers that each supply one single unit of labor, which is the only factor of production. The economy consists of two sectors: a homogeneous good sector A with constant returns to scale and a manufacturing sector C with a continuum of dierentiated varieties and monopolistic competition. In the manufacturing sector C, each rm produces a unique variety under increasing returns to scale and the rms are heterogeneous in their marginal productivities.
Preferences
The preferences of a representative household h are dened over a homogeneous good A and the set of dierentiated varieties Ω produced in sector C. Utility is a quasi-linear, logarithmic function with CES subutility over the consumption of varieties Ω:
where 0 < ρ < 1 and β > 0. The household's consumption of a variety z is given by q h (z).
The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by σ ≡ 1/ (1 − ρ). The CES price index is given by:
Utility maximization leads to per-capita expenditure for the numeraire good and the manufacturing aggregate P C h = β and A h = y h − β, respectively. To simplify notation we drop the household index h and it can be shown that indirect utility is given by:
which is decreasing in the CES price index. Total demand for and revenue of a single variety z is denoted by q (z) = βLp (z)
Production and Firm Behavior
Production in the homogeneous good sector A has constant returns to scale and perfect competition. One unit of labor translates into one unit of output. This good is used as the numeraire, so that the wage rate can be normalized to one. In the manufactured good sector C, varieties are produced with increasing returns to scale under monopolistic competition. Each rm produces one unique variety z. The technology in the manufacturing sector is comprised by total costs l = f + q/ϕ to produce q units of output. Every rm has the same overhead production cost f but rms are heterogeneous in their marginal costs 1/ϕ. A higher ϕ represents a higher productivity. Prot maximization leads to the rm-specic optimal price p, which is a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
Total demand for and revenue of a single rm can be rewritten as q (ϕ) = βL (ρϕ)
and r (ϕ) = βL (ρϕP )
, and operating prots are given by π (ϕ) = r (ϕ) /σ − f . It is evident that a rm with a higher productivity level ϕ charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity, and has a higher revenue as well as higher prots. The CES price index given 8 above can be rewritten as follows:
where M represents both the mass of manufacturing rms and varieties. The productivity distribution among active rms is μ (ϕ) and ϕ denotes the average productivity level.
Entry and Exit
At each point of time, there is a mass M E of entrepreneurs that enter the manufacturing sector C. To enter the market, entrepreneurs have to pay entry costs f e , which are thereafter sunk. After entering the industry, rms draw their productivity level from a given distribution function. In the original Melitz (2003) model the distribution of productivities among rms is unparameterized, while we assume the commonly used Pareto distribution.
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That distribution function is given by:
Here ϕ MIN > 0 is the lower bound for productivity draws and k > 1 is the shape parameter. After learning about their productivity, rms decide whether to start producing or to exit the market immediately. A rm with a productivity draw below some threshold level, ϕ < ϕ * , decides to exit, while a rm with a productivity draw above this threshold, ϕ > ϕ * , decides to stay active. Every active rm can be hit by a bad shock with a probability δ > 0 at each point of time. This would force the rm to shut down and exit the market. The probability of a bad shock is independent of ϕ. In a stationary equilibrium without time discounting, the mass of entrants, which successfully enter the market equals the mass of rms, which are forced to shut down:
is the survival probability. The endogenous productivity distribution among active rms, μ (ϕ), is then the conditional ex-ante distribution g (ϕ) on the domain (ϕ * , ∞].
Equilibrium
As in Melitz (2003) the autarky equilibrium is characterized by two conditions linking cuto productivity and average prots. The free entry condition (FEC) secures that entry occurs until the value of entry, v
, is driven to zero:
The zero cuto prot condition (ZCPC) pins down the revenue of the cuto rm, r (ϕ * ) = σf , which by using
and π = r ( ϕ) /σ − f leads to:
with k > σ + 1. As gure 1 illustrates, there exist an unique equilibrium level for ϕ * and π.
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Solving for the equilibrium value of ϕ * leads to the autarky cuto productivity ϕ * AU T
given by:
Furthermore, the equilibrium mass of surviving rms, M , and the equilibrium mass of entrants, M E , can be derived. Given that the aggregate consumption expenditure for varieties, βL, must equal the aggregate revenue of surviving rms, R = M r = Mr ( ϕ), and solving for M yields M = βL/r, where r = σ (π + f ). Moreover, the market clearing condition for the A-sector requires that the value of consumption equals the value of production,
where γ denotes the share of the workforce employed in the manufacturing sector. Solving for the manufacturing workforce yields γ = β + t and indicates that higher taxes increase the manufacturing share in the economy. This is because lump-sum taxes only reduce the consumption of the numeraire good. The mass of surviving rms is then given by
In the stationary equilibrium the mass of surviving rms and entrants is then given by:
6 The ZCPC is unaected by the minimum productivity parameter ϕ MIN and a horizontal in (ϕ, π)-space, which is an outcome of the assumed Pareto distribution. 
where
ln (β/σf) is a constant. Welfare increases in the country size L and the cuto productivity ϕ * AU T . The intuition for a welfare gain due to an increase in the cuto productivity is straightforward. A higher cuto productivity increases the average productivity, ϕ = as depicted in gure 2) does not only raise the chance to draw a better productivity in this worst case scenario, but also in all other cases. Hence, a higher minimum productivity, as illustrated in gure 2, shifts the The increased cuto and average productivity also accounts for the fact that the market consists of higher productive rms due to tougher selection, induced by a higher minimum productivity. Although in the long run perspective of a stationary equilibrium the mass of entrants and surviving rms is independent of the minimum productivity, in the short run the masses are indeed aected. The mechanism at work can be separated into two eects: First, an increase in the minimum productivity raises a rm's probability to draw a productivity level equal or larger than a given cuto productivity. Hence, expected prots rise and a larger value of entry induces more entry into the market. The second eect works in the opposite direction. A larger mass of entrants leads to more active rms in the market, inducing tougher competition. Increased competition lowers expected prots and decreases the value of entry, which in turn decreases the mass of entrants. Under the assumed Pareto distribution both eects are of equal magnitude and lead to masses M AU T and M E AU T independent of the minimum productivity. In the end, an increase in the minimum productivity ϕ MIN does not lead to more but better rms in the equilibrium. These better rms charge lower prices, sell larger output, and have higher revenue and prots. 
Technology Investments
In the following we consider endogenous investments in technology, which have to be renanced by lump-sum taxes. For simplicity we normalize the country size L = 1. The tax rate is denoted by t, and since w = 1 and L = 1, total tax revenue is given by T = t (wL) = t. We assume an ecient government such that the investment level is also denoted by T . The government invests T and the technology level in the country is denoted by H (T ). We assume that investments in technology generate positive but decreasing marginal returns, formally:
In the case of zero investments the technology level is zero, i.e. H (0) = 0. The minimum productivity draw ϕ MIN is a function of the technology level H and given by:
Note that we normalized the minimum productivity level in case of no investments. In the following we refer to the properties of H with respect to T (positive but decreasing marginal returns) and silently assume that ϕ 
Hence, a higher H also mirrors a higher minimum productivity ϕ MIN and we have positive but decreasing marginal returns of investment T .
Welfare in the closed economy case is given by:
8 Our specication of ϕ MIN leads to closed form solutions and allows for a variety of other related functional forms. Our results do not depend on the given exponential specication. 13 where
is a constant.
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The necessary condition for a welfare optimum is the rst-order condition (FOC) given by:
From the FOC we can clearly disentangle the dierent eects of higher investments in technology. Investments T rise the lump-sum tax which has a negative marginal unit welfare burden. However, they also increase the minimum productivity, rising the cuto and average productivity, decreasing the price index, and at the end increasing welfare at the margin by βH . Comparative statics can be derived by the implicit function theorem. Dene ζ ≡ H − 1/β and we have:
Result 1: Under autarky countries have an incentive to invest in technology if βH > 1 for any 0 < T < 1. It is more likely that countries invest in technology if consumers have a high preference β for varieties.
3 Open Economy
The open economy consists of two countries i = 1, 2 that are identical in the country size (L = 1) but may potentially dier in technology. We discriminate between technologies by allowing for country-specic dierences in the lower bound of the assumed Pareto distribution, as in Falvey et al. (2005) . These dierences are due to dierent levels of investments in technology. Ultimately we are interested in the endogenous determination of the investment policy. This will be analyzed in great detail in sections 4 and 5 below. For now, in section 3, we rst analyze the international equilibrium when the technology dierences are exogenously given.
9 It is furthermore worth mentioning that the consumer's choice among consumed varieties is unaected since the mass of surviving rms is independent of the minimum productivity.
10 
The ZCPC changes in the open economy due to the fact that rms can engage in exporting. Expected prots in country i are now given by
, where ϕ i is the average productivity among all domestic active rms and ϕ xi is the average productivity across exporting rms from country i.
11
Furthermore the probability to export is given by
, the ZCPC can be written as follows:
is a measure of trade openness. We assume f x ≥ f , which implies 0 < φ < 1. A higher φ indicates a higher freeness of trade. Substituting the FEC into ZCPC leads to a system of two equations in the two cutos, which in turn determines the cuto productivities in the open economy:
k measures the technological asymmetry across countries. Regarding this measure of asymmetry we need to impose a parameter restriction, which states that the asymmetry has to be modest relative to trade openness, namely χ > φ. There exists the following link between the domestic cuto and the export cuto which deter-mines the threshold productivity needed to serve the export market: ϕ * xj = Λϕ * i , where
and Λ > 1 due to f x ≥ f . We can then obtain the following ranking of productivity cutos, assuming that country 1 is the leading country and country 2 is the laggard country in terms of technology (χ < 1):
The domestic cuto in country 1 is higher than in country 2 and hence, due to ϕ * xj = Λϕ * i , the export cuto in country 1 is lower than in country 2. The high productive rms from the leading country 1 nd it easier to export to country 2, facing less productive rms and softer competition. The opposite holds for the laggard country 2. Firms are less productive and exporters face tougher competition in country 1. The allocation of the workforce which is employed in the manufacturing sector completes the description of the open economy equilibrium. To derive it, we use the aggregate trade balance condition for country 1:
The LHS of the trade balance condition denotes the value of country 1's manufacturing exports. The RHS of the equation consists of the manufacturing imports from country 2 and, if manufacturing trade is not balanced between both countries, the net exports of the numeraire (represented by the sum of the second and third term of the RHS). Appendix A proves that the labor share allocated to the manufacturing sector in country i = 1, 2 is given by:
The equations clearly show that a higher tax rate t i increases the share of labor allocated to the manufacturing sector. This is because the lump-sum tax reduces the consumption of the numeraire and increases the minimum productivity. Analyzing (16) shows that γ 1 = γ 2 = β + t if countries are symmetrical regarding their technology level (χ = 1) and that γ i = β + t i if trade costs are prohibitive (φ → 0). Because we want to ensure that the numeraire sector is still active after trade, we need to impose parameter restrictions such that 0 < γ i < 0 for i = 1, 2, which are written down in appendix A in detail. These restrictions require technology asymmetries to be modest relative to trade openness and per-capita manufacturing expenditure β and taxes t i to be suciently small. 
, where ϕ ti is the average productivity among all active rms in market i.
Finally, indirect utility in country i can be written as:
which is proportional to the domestic cuto productivity ϕ * 1 .
Technology Investments without Spillovers
We now turn to the determination of the endogenous technology investments. We assume that both countries have the same and normalized technology level if there are no investments in any country. We rst deal with the Nash-equilibrium, which results if both countries behave non-cooperatively, before addressing the case where they cooperatively set their policies. Tax income and investment level in country i are denoted by T i . Analogous to the closed economy the government in country i invests T i and the technology level is given by H (T i ). The minimum productivity draw in country i is given by:
At this point we assume that technology investments in country i do not aect the minimum productivity draw in the other country. Hence, there are no spillovers of technology investments across countries.
Nash-Equilibrium Policy
Welfare in country i is given by:
is the relative technology and κ 3 = κ 2 + β k
The necessary condition for a welfare optimum is the FOC given by:
It can be shown that there exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium policy such that both countries set the same tax rate T = T i = T j and the FOC simplies to:
In appendix A we show that this Nash-equilibrium satises the second-order condition for a welfare maximum. Using equation (21) we can clearly disentangle the dierent eects of higher investments in technology. Investments T increase the lump-sum tax, which has a negative marginal unit welfare burden. However, they also increase the minimum productivity, rising the cuto and average productivity, decreasing the price index, and at the end increasing welfare. By considering the FOC, the positive eect of investments in technology can be split into two parts. The already known eect βH we discussed in the autarky case and the new trade eect φβH / (1 − φ). To develop economic intuition for the trade eect, consider a scenario in which country 1 invests in technology, while country 2 does not. Hence country 1 is the leading and country 2 is the laggard country in terms of technology. The direct positive eect of investments in technology by country 1 is that they increase the domestic cuto ϕ * 1 . Furthermore, they also decrease the foreign cuto ϕ * 2 . Hence, investments in technology generate a negative cross-country externality to foreign rms. Concerning the export markets it is now harder for country 2 rms to serve country 1, and it is easier for country 1 rms to serve the foreign market country 2:
. The comparative advantage of country 1 rms in serving the foreign market is even more important, the higher the prot from international trade is, i.e. the higher the trade freeness φ is. This eect mirrors the strategic incentive for governments to invest in technology. The higher trade freeness is, the higher is the governments' incentive to give domestic rms a competitive advantage in competition with foreign rms. Hence, trade liberalization should increase investments in technology. To see this analytically, dene 12 Again we have to impose that asymmetry has to be modest relative to trade openness, namelyχ > φ. 
Result 2: Nash-equilibrium policy without spillovers: Trade liberalization leads to higher investments in technology. Now consider the scenario, where countries cooperatively set their policies. Joint welfare Ω of both countries is given by: (23) where κ 4 = 2κ 1 is a constant. The necessary condition for a welfare optimum for country 1 is given by:
where the argument of the exponential function is suppressed to simplify notation and given by exp {·} = exp {k (−H (T 1 ) + H (T 2 ))}. For country 2 the FOC is the following:
where the argument of the exponential function is again suppressed and given by exp {·} = exp {−H (T 1 ) + H (T 2 )}. Imposing T 1 = T 2 = T due to symmetry yields the simplied FOC as follows:
Result 3: Cooperative policy without spillovers: The cooperative solution is equivalent to the autarky policy. Trade liberalization leads to no change in the investments in technology compared to the autarky case. In the Nash-equilibrium policy trade liberalization leads to higher investments compared to the autarky scenario, and thus to over-investments in technology from a social perspective. The economic intuition is straightforward. Technology investments lead to a negative cross-country externality that is not taken into account in the Nash-equilibrium policy. This negative externality is internalized in the cooperative solution, and thus leads to lower investments than in the Nash-equilibrium policy.
5 Technology Investments with Spillovers
We now relax the somehow restrictive assumption that technology investments solely affect the minimum productivity of the home country. Henceforth we assume that home investments in technology also generate a spillover to the minimum productivity draw in the foreign country.
14 Doing so, we introduce another channel how trade liberalization impacts the equilibrium outcome. The government in country i invests T i and the technology level in country i, induced by home investments, is H (T i ). However, the overall technology level in country i is also positively aected by investments T j of the foreign country j. The foreign part of technology improvement is denoted by F (T j ). Even if countries are identical with respect to country size and the return of investments, our notation allows for a separation of the technology improving impact of domestic and foreign investments in technology. For both H and F we assume that investments in technology generate positive but decreasing marginal returns, formally:
The minimum productivity draw in the home country i is given by:
(27) and it is clear that the minimum productivity draw now positively depends on not only the home investment level T i but also on the investments T j of the foreign country j. The impact of the spillover φF increases in φ, since we consider trade openness φ as a broad measure of economic integration. The spillover is then more pronounced, the more the economies are integrated. 15 We typically expect that investments in technology have a stronger impact on the domestic minimum productivity level than on the foreign minimum productivity. We dene Δ ≡ H − F and call the typical case of Δ > 0 a weak spillover. Nevertheless, in certain cases, investments in education may have a stronger impact to a foreign country than to the home country. This may be the case, for instance, in some 14 See also the industrial organization literature on R&D spillovers, e.g. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) . They argue that R&D investments not only lead to a new product innovation but may also impact the other rm's ability to assimilate and exploit their production technologies.
15 See Adams (1990) , Jae (1989) and Branstetter (2001) for empirical evidence that e.g. patent citations actually decrease in distance. Or as the authors (Jae et al., 1998, p.968) note spillovers are limited to specic areas and not just the diuse eect of a large research university. Hence for our model these studies also suggest that the magnitude of the spillover positively depends on the trade openness. small countries like Hong Kong, whose educational quality is very high and attracts many students from foreign countries. Thus Hong Kong's investments in education may have a stronger impact to foreign countries than to Hong Kong itself. For situations like that, we assume Δ < 0 and call it a strong spillover.
Nash-Equilibrium Policy
In appendix A we show that this Nash-equilibrium satises the second-order condition for a welfare maximum. Formally the marginal benet of investments in technology can be split into two parts. The already known trade eect (see section 4. 
If we assume a weak spillover, i.e. Δ = H − F > 0, we get:
Result 4: Nash-equilibrium policy with weak spillovers: Trade liberalization increases investments in technology.
Hence, for weak spillovers and without spillovers (see Result 2) trade liberalization leads to higher investments in technology in Nash-equilibrium policy. A natural question is whether this result also holds for strong spillovers. Put dierently, we ask ourselves if there is a case in which trade liberalization actually leads to lower investments in technology? Solving
∂T ∂φ
= 0 for φ leads to:φ
withφ < 1 if and only if Δ < 0, which mirrors a strong spillover of technology investments to the foreign country. Hence, for a suciently high trade openness φ >φ, investments in technology decrease with further trade liberalization. Note that a lower Δ mirrors a stronger spillover to the foreign country, and the incentive to decrease investments starts at a lower trade openness φ sinceφ decreases with lower Δ.
Result 5: Nash-equilibrium policy with strong spillovers: Trade liberalization rst leads to an increase and then to a decrease of investments (hump-shaped relationship).
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The result that the level of investments is lower in cases where spillovers exist is a well known result in the industrial organization literature on investments in R&D, see e.g. Spence (1984) as a seminal reference. 17 Note that if the impact of the foreign technology investment level is zero, i.e. Why do countries decrease investments in technology with higher trade openness? The reason is that with strong spillovers the total eect (marginal benet) of trade integration can actually be negative. In this case the spillover eect outweighs the trade eect. In this context, recall the example of Hong Kong, where investments in education might convey foreign countries more than the domestic country itself.
Cooperative Policy
Now consider the cooperative solution. The joint welfare function of both countries Ω is given by: (34) where κ 4 = 2κ 1 is a constant. The necessary condition for a welfare optimum is the FOC. For country 1 it is given by:
where the argument of the exponential function is suppressed to simplify notation and given by exp {·} = exp {φF (
For country 2 the FOC is given by:
where the argument of the exponential function is again suppressed and given by exp {·} = exp {φF (T 1 ) − φF (T 2 ) − H (T 1 ) + H (T 2 )}. Imposing T 1 = T 2 = T yields the simplied FOC as follows:
spillover. Solving the FOC for the optimal tax rate yields
. T * reaches its maximum at s = 1/φ 2 > 1. Hence, there exists only a maximum for 0 < T * < 1 if s > 1, which mirrors a strong spillover.
We use the implicit function theorem and ζ = −1 + βH + βφF to derive:
Result 6: Cooperative policy with spillovers: Trade liberalization leads to higher investments in technology. In comparison to the cooperative policy without spillovers (Eq.(26)) we nd a positive impact of trade openness on the investment level. The economic reason is that investments in the scenario with spillovers do not only improve the domestic rms' technology level but they also generate a positive externality on the technology of foreign rms. The latter eect is stronger, the higher the degree of trade openness. In comparison to the Nash-equilibrium policy the spillover does not dampen the incentive to invest. Exactly the opposite it true. Spillovers lead to a positive externality to the foreign country that is internalized in the cooperative solution and increases in φ.
To compare the cooperative policy with the Nash-equilibrium policy we rewrite the FOCs Eq.(30) and Eq.(37), respectively. They are given by:
and
(40) Both FOCs only dier in the last term of Eq.(40). The sign of Δ depends on whether the investments spillover is weak or strong. If the spillover to the foreign country is strong (Δ < 0), the investment level T * Nash in the Nash-equilibrium policy is then lower than the welfare maximizing investment level T * Coop of the cooperative solution. If the spillover is weak (Δ > 0) the investment level T * Nash in the Nash-equilibrium policy is then higher compared to the cooperative solution T * Coop . Figure 4 plots the teacher-per-pupils ratio for 74 countries against the TI -measure and suggests a positive correlation. In fact, the simple OLS regression (T eacher/P upils) i = α+β 1 ·T I i +β 2 ·(T I i ) 2 +β 3 ·laborproductivity i + i has signicant coecients β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0, which actually suggests that a humpedshaped relationship seems to t the data. 23 This result is driven, however, by the countries with the highest openness levels like Hong Kong or Malaysia. For those countries it is most likely that investments in technology not only improve the domestic technological capabilities but also the foreign technology level of surrounding countries. In these cases the spillovers are probably strong (Δ < 0) and our model predicts that trade liberalization 19 Some authors like Corcos et al. (2009) provide indirect estimations for the minimum productivity using a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework. For the 15 EU countries they provide estimations for the so called exogenous competitiveness, a bundle of sunk entry costs, factor prices, and the minimum productivity. 20 The correlation coecient of the teacher-per-pupils ratio with exogenous competitiveness by Corcos et al. (2009) For the vast majority of countries, gure 4 suggests that freer trade can go hand in hand with higher technology investments, which is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of our model. This conclusion is, of course, suggestive at best, especially since gure 4 makes no pretense of capturing any causal relationship between trade freeness and technology investments. A more detailed empirical analysis of these issues seems to be an interesting avenue for future research.
